Examine your EDR telemetry or other process command logs for the following #clickfix flow:
Explorer.exe -> powershell.exe -> cmd.exe -> curl/wget to grab a .ps1 -> powershell.exe
The above flow was initiated using a Cloudflare Captcha challenge on a compromised website which fooled the victim into running the clipboard command. Also, look out for internet traffic which sources from copilot.exe. It won’t have a referrer in proxy logging which made figuring out where or how the victim initially hit the clickfix domain difficult. EDR telemetry ultimately showed copilot.exe making the initial netconn to the clickfix domain. Microsoft purview analysis of copilot was needed to figure out what the victim entered in the prompt to drive them to compromised site hosting the clickfix payload.
Mitigation is to recommend restricting cmd.exe or powershell.exe execution to privileged groups only. Bob in the C-suite shouldn’t be able to use run to execute cmd.exe commands copied to his clipboard. Scope usage of cmd/powershell so you don’t blow up legitimate patching or remote assistance efforts. Also, know if copilot is on in your org and restrict or create privileged groups who need it.
Almost every threat actor I track now is using clickfix technique, apparently because it works. Users are more than happy to self-diagnose problems or solve bogus captchas by doing what prompts tell them to do.